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Abstract Influenza is the most frequent travel related
infection preventable by universally available vaccines,
but preventive measures were neglected until recently.
Since the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, various public
health measures have been promoted first to contain, then
to mitigate, the pandemic. Some of these measures contra-
dicted recommendations issued by the World Health
Organization and were of questionable efficacy. However,
travelers may benefit from targeted recommendations on
influenza risk reduction (eg, by social distancing or
immunization). These recommendations are particularly
indicated for those with an increased personal risk profile
and for those likely to be exposed to influenza patients.
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Introduction
When it became apparent in April 2009 that influenza A
(H1N1) 2009 was a “Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern” and subsequently pandemic Phase 6 was
declared by the World Health Organization (WHO), the
world was on the move. The latest World Tourism
Organization statistics had reported 922 million Interna-
tional Tourist Arrivals for the year 2008, although a clear
negative growth was experienced in the second half of 2008
[1]. Although many countries initially attempted aggressive
containment as the initial strategy to limit the spread of
infection, it soon became obvious that the virus had already
spread worldwide. Mitigation to win time (ie, until vaccines
would be widely available) soon became the logical strategy.
The WHO explicitly did not recommend restricting interna-
tional travel; moreover, it never did. Nevertheless, various
national authorities imposed restrictive or diagnostic meas-
ures, although many of these measures previously were
demonstrated to be ineffective (Table 1).
Influenza in Travelers: Epidemiologic Facts
The incidence rate of seasonal influenza in travelers to
tropical and subtropical countries is estimated to be 1% per
month [2••]. The risk of influenza transmission related to
travel (eg, at airports, in the aircraft cabin) is undetermined;
only three reports of in-flight transmission have been
published [3]. The aircraft as a vector for global spread of
influenza is of greater concern. In the current pandemic, it
has been demonstrated that countries receiving more than
1,400 passengers from Mexico were at a significantly
elevated risk for importation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009;
international air traffic alone was more than 92% sensitive
and specific in predicting importation [4•]. However, a
variety of other respiratory viruses have also been diag-
nosed during that phase, including rhinovirus, coronavirus,
influenza B, and parainfluenza virus, illustrating that many
different viral transmissions can simultaneously occur even
during a pandemic [5]. Travel-associated spread of influ-
enza (H1N1) 2009 at a rock music festival in Belgium was
reported [6]. However, although this pandemic had a
significant impact during the winter in Australia, “swine
flu” hardly affected consumers’ outbound travel plans [7].
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Even before the appearance of the influenza (H1N1)
2009 pandemic, influenza or unspecified upper respiratory
tract infections associated with mass events, such as the
winter Olympic games [8] or the hajj [9], had been
documented. Influenza outbreaks had also occurred in
association with cruise ship travel [10].
Evaluation of Travel-Related Public Health Measures
Within the limited time since the detection of this current
pandemic, little substantial evidence on the efficacy of
specific travel-related public health measures had been
presented. Thus, we shall examine the plausible effect of
these measures or draw analogies with previous pandemic
threats.
Considering the measures listed in Table 1, it is logical
that postponing nonessential travel to countries or, more
specifically, to areas with high prevalence of pandemic
influenza (H1N1) 2009 may reduce the spread. In contrast,
it is difficult to understand why some countries issued
travel restrictions for certain destinations that were of
comparatively low risk. Traffic restrictions such as closing
borders is not mentioned in the revised International Health
Regulations (IHR 2005) and the Third Meeting of the IHR
Emergency Committee explicitly recommended not to close
borders [11]. At best, some small island nations could
successfully rely on intensive travel-volume restrictions
alone to avoid the arrival of pandemic influenza or of
subsequent pandemic waves [12].
Entry screening of travelers through thermal scanning at
international borders had hardly any documented effect on
detecting severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases;
exit screening appeared slightly more effective [13]. The
WHO explicitly states that it “does not believe entry and
exit screenings would work to reduce the spread of this
disease. However, country-level measures to respond to a
public health risk are the decision of national authorities
under the International Health Regulations 2005” [14].
Consequently, a report specified that “border screening had
too strong a political imperative in Australia not to be
implemented in the early stages of the pandemic” (ie, entry
screening, although known to be ineffective, was imple-
mented under political and media pressure) [7].
Health declarations also did not show detectable benefit.
SARS was contained largely through traditional public
health interventions, such as finding and isolating case-
patients, quarantining close contacts, and enhanced infec-
tion control. A pilot study has demonstrated that screening
at disembarkation requires large numbers of staff [15].
Because viral shedding in influenza patients starts 1 to
2 days before the onset of symptoms [16], entry screening
is not a method that would allow detection of asymptomatic
passengers during the incubation period. Persistent viral
Table 1 The initial noncoordinated response to the H1N1 (2009) pandemic: examples of measures related to international travel
Travel advisories Countries/institutions (examples)
Postpone nonessential travel—all India, Malta, New Zealand
- To Mexico Canada, Indonesia, Israel, USA
- To Mexico, USA, Canada Malaysia
- To countries with confirmed case Australia, Belize, Bosnia, Kuwait
- To Portugal Chinese Taipei (Taiwan)
- To Britain, Spain, USA Uganda
- To China Mexico
Traffic restrictions
- Ban nonstop flights to Mexico Argentina, China, Cuba, Peru
- Closure of borders Neighbors of Ukraine (November)
In-flight and entry/exit measures at airports
- Doctor on board Lufthansa from Mexico to Germany
- Crew must notify air traffic control about suspected communicable illness ICAO, Aircraft General Declaration (Annex 9, Appendix 1)
- Visual screen by health professionals on arrival Various countries
- Temperature check devices Various countries
- Information leaflets Various countries
- Contact cards, questionnaire Various countries
- Quarantine (hotel), self-quarantine (home) Hong Kong, Philippines
- Predeparture exit screening Mexico
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
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shedding may potentially allow for transmission after
patients recover clinically [17]. Symptomatic passengers
may use antipyretic agents to pass thermal screening
undetected. The value of border screening in deterring
travel by ill persons and in building public confidence is
unsubstantiated. Also, the value of health alerts or other
information leaflets and posters remains to be evaluated.
Given that the 2009 hajj would take place at the end of
November—during the pandemic wave in the Northern
hemisphere—health authorities of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia held consultations with the WHO to mitigate the
effects of influenza [18, 19]. It was concluded that:
– High-risk groups should voluntarily refrain from hajj,
particularly
○ Pregnant women and individuals with chronic
disease
○ Those younger than 12 years or older than 65 years
of age (25% usually are pilgrims older than 65)
– Thermal screening should be done on arrival to isolate
patients with influenza-like illness
– Various nonpharmaceutical preventive measures should
be recommended, such as
○ Washing (with soap) required before the five prayers
○ Hand sanitizers with alcohol permitted
○ Cough etiquette (but no face masks)
– To obtain the hajj visa, proof of vaccination with
monovalent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine was
required for those originating in countries with supplies
of vaccine
– Antivirals
○ Routine chemoprophylaxis was not recommended
○ As soon as possible, treat all hospitalized persons
and outpatients in high-risk groups
According to preliminary results, among the 1.6 million
hajj pilgrims in 2009, 40% were immunized against
seasonal influenza, and 10% had received the pandemic
(H1N1) vaccine. There were 73 confirmed cases of
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and five deaths associated with
the infection [20••], which is less than many would have
expected.
Singapore has published a first account regarding its
containment phase from the end of April to the end of June
2009. In this period, 116 of the 152 patients at Tan Tock
Seng Hospital with confirmed pandemic influenza (H1N1)
met the definition for having an imported, travel-associated
infection. Several observations are relevant. The first cases
of pandemic influenza (H1N1) arriving from several
countries in Southeast Asia were recorded earlier than the
official recognition of community transmission in those
countries. One quarter of those patients had boarded their
flights despite the onset of symptomatic illness. Only 54%
of all patients had temperatures exceeding 38°C as per the
case definitions suggested by the WHO and the US Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Only 13% of
the patients, therefore, were detected by screening at the
airport, whereas 87% were self-reported to Tan Tock Seng
Hospital or were referred there by doctors in the city [21••].
Options for Individual Prevention and Self-Therapy
In all likelihood, travelers will continue to need specific
advice regarding pandemic influenza in the coming months
because further pandemic waves may occur. The WHO
does not recommend travel restrictions related to pandemic
influenza (H1N1) 2009, except for persons who are ill [14].
In slight contrast, the CDC recommends that travelers at
increased risk of complications from influenza may want to
consider postponing travel [22]. Based on mathematical
modeling, there is no reason to delay international travel to
reduce the spread of infection [14]. Both the WHO and the
CDC recommend social distancing from patients and basic
hygienic measures to help prevent the spread of infection.
Surprisingly, neither agency mentions vaccination being
indicated for travel, whereas we would consider it clearly
indicated or to be considered for at least some groups of
travelers (Table 2) [23•]. The seasonal vaccine for use in the
2010 Southern hemisphere influenza season will contain an
A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)-like virus; an A/Perth/16/2009
(H3N2)-like virus; and a B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus [24].
Thus, it will no longer be necessary to inject a separate
pandemic vaccine. Clearly, it would be beneficial for travel
health physicians to have the vaccine designated for the
opposite hemisphere available in addition to having the
vaccine for their own hemisphere [25]. For instance, there
Table 2 Travel-related recommendation of pandemic (H1N1) 2009
vaccine or seasonal influenza vaccine containing the pandemic strain
(21)
Primarily based on national recommendations in travelers, particularly
recommend/consider
○ High-risk groups and their travel companions:
● Age: very low, senior travelers older than 50 y (USA), 60–65 y
● Comorbidity: particularly cardiopulmonary, immunologic
● Medical tourists
○ High-risk settings:
● Captive setting: cruise ship, camp, mass gathering, tour group,
crews
● Occupational: medical, multiple contacts, including hotel staff
● Expedition participants (eg, high-altitude trekking)
○ All who request maximum protection
(Data from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [21])
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may be an increased need for those attending the FIFA
World Cup in South Africa in June-July 2010 [26].
The CDC recommends that travelers at increased risk for
complications should consult with their doctors and
consider carrying antiviral medications with them on their
trip as a treatment option, particularly in situations where
appropriate medical care may be delayed or unavailable
[21••]. Possibly antivirals for the travel kit should also be
discussed with travelers in high-risk settings, such as those
with occupational exposure, with multiple contacts, or
some travelers who will be in confined settings (eg, cruise
ships; Table 2) [23•].
Conclusions
Global surveillance for the first time made it possible to
follow the evolution of the influenza pandemic on a daily
basis. Several weeks after the report of the initial influenza
(H1N1) 2009 outbreaks, it was recognized that containment
strategies could no longer be sustained, and the goal shifted
to mitigating the effects of the pandemic until vaccination
became feasible. While preparing for a possible second
wave of the pandemic, vaccination gained emphasis in the
prevention of influenza (H1N1) 2009; the 2010 seasonal
Southern hemisphere vaccine will contain the pandemic
strain. In addition to vaccination, other measures (eg,
hygiene practices and social distancing) are important to
maintain good health during travel. Travelers will continue to
benefit from specific advice targeting influenza prevention.
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